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It is unlikely that any new regulatory regime will involve the 
establishment of a completely new regulatory institution. 
Instead, regulatory responsibility is more often apportioned 
to an existing institution, or several institutions within a 
portfolio that most closely match the subject matter of the 
regulatory regime in question. This article therefore offers 
guidance less for those involved in the initial policy design 
phase, and more for those engaged in implementation 
and operational policy, as well as those with review and 
reform agendas. In emphasising these policy and policy-like 
elements, the article takes as its lead the argument made by 
the New Zealand Productivity Commission and the New 
Zealand government that the traditional emphasis of review 
and reform efforts on regulatory design has acted to the 
detriment of implementation and better regulatory practice.
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In 2014 the Productivity Commission 
released a comprehensive and cross-
cutting report, Regulatory Institutions 
and Practices (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2014). The report 
outlined a number of policy choices for 
governments, regulatory institutions, and 
regulatory practitioners and managers in 
terms of how they approach their work. 
Notably, it suggested moving beyond 
responding to various crises towards a 
strategic (and system-wide) development 
of regulatory capacity and capability. In 
2015 the Government Response to the New 
Zealand Productivity Commission Report 
on Regulatory Institutions and Practices 
reinforced that:
there is a need for the different 
agencies involved in designing 
and administering regulation, 
and monitoring how effectively 
[it] is functioning, to lift their 
game. The system as a whole also 
needs to work more coherently, 
to secure real improvements in 
regulatory outcomes. (New Zealand 
Government, 2015, p.1)
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The utility of the Productivity 
Commission report is enhanced by 
the fact that it is not commodity- or 
legislation-specific. The term commodity 
in this article refers to the way it is used 
in Australian environmental regulatory 
terminology, and relates to the physical 
subject matter covered by regulation; 
conversely, in the US and UK the term 
used is media, with the traditional 
environmental media being air, water, 
waste and pollution. Instead of having this 
sort of focus, the report covers a range of 
matters through the themes of improving 
regulatory institutions and practices 
and better regulatory management. The 
sub-themes considered under these two 
headings are outlined in Table 1. Those 
matters of particular relevance to this 
article appear in italics.
This article considers the policy and 
implementation issues raised by the report 
and the government’s response to it in 
application to environmental regulation 
and the various environmental regulatory 
agencies, as well as their functions and 
roles. It does so in an attempt to provide 
practical guidance to policy makers 
on how the structure of regulatory 
institutions – as collections of regulatory 
practices – affects implementation. In 
other words, the nature of the institution 
as a collection of systems and practices 
has ongoing impacts on the effectiveness 
with which the institution achieves its 
outcomes.
While the focus of the article is on 
environmental institutions, many of 
the issues associated with regulatory 
design, implementation and review 
are transferable and are worthy of 
consideration by regulatory institutions 
in other regulatory fields.
For the purposes of this article, 
regulatory institutions are defined as the 
governmental bodies, including agencies, 
bureaus and departments, tasked with 
implementation of legislation containing 
regulatory provisions (which incorporate 
a range of functions, from setting, 
monitoring and enforcing standards 
to providing guidance to the regulated 
community). The definition covers all 
regulatory institutions, operating at local, 
regional, central/federal and international 
levels. This definition does not include 
industry bodies (even ones established by 
government).
Equally, regulatory practices are 
taken to be those activities and processes 
undertaken by a regulatory institution to 
implement and give effect to legislation 
with regulatory provisions. Necessarily, 
this includes the management and 
governance of regulatory officers engaged 
in their daily work. In referring to 
regulatory systems, this article uses the 
definition provided by Manch, where:
Reference to the ‘regulatory 
environment’ means the environment 
in which our regulatory systems 
operate. Reference to ‘regulatory 
systems’ means the end-to-end 
approach of government intending 
to influence or compel specific 
behaviour. (Manch, 2014, p.18)
Regulatory systems are therefore 
the collection of regulatory practices 
undertaken to give effect to legislation 
with regulatory provisions.
The regulatory experiment
Bailey and Kavanagh (2014) highlight that 
designing and implementing regulation is 
extremely difficult. They consider it to be 
‘fraught with complexity, severe know-
ledge gaps, unintended consequences, 
speculation about the efficacy of different 
regulatory arrangements, and a regulatory 
environment which is in a state of constant 
change’ (p.15). Mumford (2011) states 
that ‘the reality [is] that for the most part 
regulatory regimes are experiments ... 
[and] we do not know in advance precisely 
how it will work in practice’ (p.36). This 
argument speaks to the connections 
between the regulatory development 
process (design: the making of laws, rules, 
ordinances and other instruments) and the 
practices that comprise operationalisation 
(implementation of those instruments), 
which is also variously called regulatory 
delivery (OECD, 2014a), regulatory 
administration (Australian National Audit 
Office, 2014), regulatory implementation, 
regulatory activity or regulatory practice 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission, 
2014; New Zealand Government, 2015). 
Unfortunately, there is a sense that the 
regulatory experiment is being conducted 
in a less than scientific manner. Mumford 
goes on to state: ‘[i]n complex decision-
making contexts we often revert to 
heuristics, or “rules of thumb”’ (2011, 
p.41). What is required, perhaps, is greater 
study, with a focus on what is already 
in place and what might be expected to 
eventuate. In determining better rules 
of thumb for the regulatory experiment, 
Mumford states, ‘[i]n an experimental 
frame the two that we might emphasise 
are “thinking ahead” and “thinking 
along the way”’ (ibid.). This suggests an 
approach that can be taken not only in 
the design stage of regulation, as already 
stated, but also in the review stage 
(including performance auditing, reform 
and continuous improvement).
The inclusion of systems, practices and 
institutions in regulatory reform
Bailey and Kavanagh have noted that 
‘[m]uch of the focus of regulatory 
management in New Zealand, and in other 
Table 1: Regulatory Institutions and Practices report: recommendations and areas of focus
Improving regulatory institutions and practices Better regulatory management
•	 regulatory practice
•	 regulatory culture and leadership 
•	 workforce capability 
•	 effective	consultation	and	engagement	
•	 regulation	and	the	Treaty	of	Waitangi	
•	 role clarity 
•	 regulatory independence and institutional 
form 
•	 governance, decision rights and discretion
•	 decision	review
•	 approaches	to	funding	regulators
•	 monitoring	and	oversight
•	 system-wide regulatory review
•	 information	to	understand	and	manage	the	
system
•	 strengthening institutions
Source: New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014, pp.vi-viii
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parts of the world, has focused at the front 
end, on the quality of regulation-making’ 
(Bailey and Kavanagh, 2014, p.16). There 
is an acknowledgment, in the work of the 
New Zealand Productivity Commission 
and the government response, that the 
emphasis of efforts directed to the analysis 
and reform of regulation have, in the past, 
been centred on the policy associated with 
creating or amending a regulatory regime 
and its reflection in statute, possibly 
extending to secondary regulation. In 
response, the Productivity Commission 
undertook to ‘develop guidance for 
improving the design of new regulatory 
regimes and recommend system-wide 
improvement to the operation of existing 
regimes’ (ibid., p.10). The Productivity 
Commission report and the government 
response, therefore, mark a shift towards 
a consideration not only of the process 
of developing regulatory instruments, 
but also of the systems, institutions and 
practices engaged in giving subsequent 
effect to those instruments. 
The state of regulatory institutions and 
systems
The use of unexamined heuristic thinking 
in regulatory systems, as described by 
Mumford, has created a significant 
number of challenges and problems. 
These problems are core issues that affect 
the entirety of any number of regulatory 
systems. In fact, the issues arise within 
the systems themselves, and therefore a 
systemic approach is needed to address 
them.
The first is the failure on the part of 
institutions to apply basic understandings 
to the management and practice of 
administered regulation. On this Bailey 
and Kavanagh observe:
Although there have been 
improvements in regulatory 
management systems, departments 
still do not, in general, systematically 
apply basic good management 
principles and practices to the 
regulatory regimes that they 
administer. (Ibid., p.13)
The second issue is a failure in forming 
the requisite agency-wide culture within 
an institution (ibid., p.14). The reason 
this is so important in terms of regulatory 
practice is the interconnectedness of the 
various regulatory roles. ‘The critical 
elements of the regulatory system are 
self-reinforcing and display a level of 
interdependency’ (ibid., p.12). The 
organisational culture in an institution 
in this context is a systematic support 
that maintains effectiveness across the 
interlinked regulatory areas.
The third issue is the inability of 
regulatory institutions to develop and 
progress. ‘[I]t appears that institutional 
constraints within our regulatory system 
have rendered it virtually incapable 
of gradual evolution and incremental 
change’ (ibid., p.15). It is the form of the 
institutions themselves, as embodiments 
of entrenched unconscious heuristic 
processes, that forms part of the problem 
and inhibits efforts to overcome those 
problems.
Resolving systemic regulatory issues
Bailey and Kavanagh noted that the 
strengthening of regulatory systems 
should include:
•	 defining	the	overall	objective	of	
the system and bringing focus and 
attention to it;
•	 strategic	prioritisation	of	effort	
across the system;
•	 specifying	and	allocating	tasks	for	
improving the system; and 
•	 promoting	continuous	improvement	
in regulatory design and practice. 
(ibid., p.15)
In accord with this, and noting 
the resistance of heuristic regulatory 
institutional forms to reform, this 
article undertakes an initial analysis of 
environmental regulatory agency forms as 
institutionalised systems. While limited in 
this respect, such an analysis could serve 
as an example for other institutional 
systemic analyses.
The Productivity Commission report 
as part of better regulatory management 
suggested a system-wide regulatory review 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission, 
p.374). Bailey and Kavanagh further 
suggest that:
A systems approach to regulatory 
management would see monitoring 
and review of regimes not as the end 
of a process – or worse, forgotten 
about entirely – but as a fundamental 
part of enhancing the quality and 
impact of the regulatory system. 
(Bailey and Kavanagh, 2014, p.16)
Environmental regulatory practice
Administering environmental regulation 
is a complex and difficult process (Pink 
and White, 2015; Emison and Morris, 
2012). Legal frameworks offer multiple 
litigation and sanction options that can 
be negotiated or imposed, leading to 
punitive or restorative outcomes, with the 
possibility, and increasing likelihood, that 
a mix of all approaches may be necessary 
(Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2013; Freiberg, 
2010; Sparrow, 2008). There are diverse 
kinds of regulated entities. Some are large 
multinational corporations, others are 
medium enterprises, and some (perhaps 
even the majority) are small businesses. 
A small part of the regulated community 
comprises organised career criminals 
engaged in networks which have ties to 
other forms of organised crime, and, 
potentially, terrorist organisations (Wyatt, 
2013; UNODC, 2010).
Environmental regulation, like most 
forms of regulation, must also deal 
There have been difficulties in adapting 
police and customs bodies (and even the 
courts) to environmental roles, though 
these bodies have continued to be tasked 
with certain aspects.
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with a number of political pressures 
from governments of the day and their 
particular platforms. Industry groups 
are opposed to bureaucratic clutter 
because of the compliance costs incurred 
(Productivity Commission, 2012, 2013). 
Meanwhile, environmental advocates 
push for tighter controls or, increasingly, 
blanket bans on certain commercial 
activities as a result of their concerns for 
environmental effects, especially from 
new and emerging technologies. Cianchi 
(2015) notes that such environmental 
activists are becoming increasingly 
radicalised. In short, the provision of 
environmental regulatory delivery occurs 
in a highly contested space, especially so 
when sanctions or responses are levied as 
well as administered by regulators (Pink 
and Marshall, 2015).
Environmental regulatory institutions as 
collections of practices
The government bodies that exist to 
administer environmental regulation and 
respond to environmental crime tend to 
fall into three groups. These are the police, 
customs agencies and environmental 
regulatory agencies (Pink, forthcoming 
2016).1 There have been difficulties in 
adapting police and customs bodies (and 
even the courts) to environmental roles, 
though these bodies have continued to 
be tasked with certain aspects. To ensure 
full coverage of environmental regulatory 
requirements, the greater part of the 
regulatory role is given to environmental 
regulatory agencies which have distinctive 
and recognisable characteristics. These 
agencies fall into three broad types. For 
the purposes of this article, these are the 
environmental protection agency, the 
environmental commodity agency and 
the hybrid environmental agency. In 
summary:
•	 environmental protection agencies are 
dedicated regulators undertaking 
activities closely aligned with the 
traditional four main media: air, 
water, pollution and waste;
•	 environmental commodity agencies 
are commodity (media)-oriented 
bodies undertaking activities aligned 
with the specific matter, subject or 
geographic location2 (and associated 
commodities, sectors and industries) 
they have been established to 
administer and regulate;
•	 hybrid environmental agencies 
are government bodies that to 
varying degrees combine policy, 
programmatic and regulatory 
activities and responsibilities. 
Policy, programmatic and regulatory 
activities and responsibilities 
This article draws distinctions between the 
three main types of governmental activity: 
policy, programmatic and regulatory. This 
will be explored further in the discussion 
of the different environmental regulatory 
agencies. 
The policy role involves supporting 
the government of the day in policy 
development and determining the best 
way to put that policy into effect. The 
two options are through programmes or 
by regulatory delivery, whichever is most 
likely to succeed.
Programmatic approaches, in broad 
terms, are undertaken to maximise 
benefit, while regulatory approaches are 
intended to minimise ‘harm and nuisance’ 
(Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2013, p.106). 
There are arguments that maximising one 
thing is the same as minimising the other, 
and in some instances this may be the 
case, though it seems an approach that 
lacks nuance. Either way, there is a notable 
difference in the way the two tendencies 
are implemented in government practice. 
Programmatic practices ultimately rely 
on the fiscal power of the state: the power 
to fund and provide. Regulatory practices 
rely on the physical power of the state: the 
power to deny; that is, to deny freedom of 
action through banning the action or, in 
serious cases, incarcerating the actor. 
Programmatic efforts, looking to 
maximise benefit, involve practices 
that are fostering, facilitative and 
motivating, with financial support as a 
core component, often in the form of 
‘contracts, grants, loans, subsidies or 
incentives’ (ibid., p.106). Alternatively, 
programmatic practices include the 
establishment of marketplaces in which 
beneficiaries can trade, or use the power 
of exhortation or the power to convene, 
both to persuade behavioural change 
without direct financial support.
Regulatory implementation, which 
is intended to minimise harm, involves 
practices that by contrast constrain, limit 
and circumscribe. In short, they regulate. 
Instead of incentives, regulatory practices 
contain penalties as a core component. 
Such penalties include incarceration, 
fines, suspensions, seizure, confiscation, 
cancellations, restitution, and either 
mandatory or prohibitive orders (ibid., 
pp.249-51). Regulation may also be 
indirect, by requiring delegated regulators 
(such as local government) to act, which 
involves devolution of practice but not 
responsibility.
It is worth noting that the regulatory 
and the programmatic are options for 
achieving outcomes. They can exist 
simultaneously in terms of achieving 
a broad policy goal. However, in 
circumstances where a policy develops 
without a clear consideration of the 
factors informing the choice of option, 
the two can find themselves operating in 
competition. At worst they can hinder the 
effectiveness of one another (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission, 2014). 
Environmental protection agencies
The Environmental Protection Agency is 
a dedicated regulator created by statute 
(Emison and Morris, 2012; Mintz, 2012). 
Its remit tends to be to administer laws 
relating to the traditional environmental 
commodities or media: water, air, pollution 
Regulatory implementation, which is 
intended to minimise harm, involves 
practices that by contrast constrain, limit 
and circumscribe.
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and waste (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, nd). It does not 
necessarily have a policy or programmatic 
branch, though it can undertake extensive 
encouraging and advising of activities to 
help ensure regulated entities comply with 
the relevant environmental regulatory 
regimes. (See, for example, the Victoria 
Environment Protection Authority in 
Australia.)3
In addition to this, environmental 
protection agencies can adopt the ‘expert 
model of regulation’ (Sparrow, 2012) 
and develop responses to environmental 
issues outside the remit prescribed by 
their legislation. When this occurs, 
agencies are obviously unable to fall 
back on their authority and powers 
under law. This means they have to find 
alternative courses of action for resolving 
environmental impacts, including 
negotiation, conciliation, encouragement 
and persuasion (Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge, 2013; Sparrow, 2012). 
Characteristics of environmental protection 
agencies
The core task of the environmental 
protection agency remains regulatory 
work. Staff within environmental 
protection agencies see themselves, and 
are purposively trained, as regulators.4 
Particular training and authorisation 
attaches to their role the use of coercive 
powers, which environmental protection 
agency officers are expected to exercise 
routinely and appropriately. The use of 
powers is covered by standard operating 
procedures, and the levying of sanctions 
is conducted by reference to a mapped 
schedule of non-compliance responses.5 
While environmental protection agencies 
predominantly establish frameworks6 for 
their officers to operate within, individual 
officers have high degrees of autonomy, 
especially those appointed as authorised 
officers7 under legislation. Legislation 
frequently apportions decision-making 
power and discretion to authorised 
officers in relation to addressing suspected 
or potential breaches of environmental 
legislation. While circumstances can require 
timely, on-the-spot action, the result can 
create a tension between the needs of the 
moment and the overall necessity to achieve 
a consistent, proportionate, repeatable, 
measurable approach to regulatory delivery 
across the agency.
Environmental commodity agencies
The environmental commodity agency 
is a body that focuses on one specific 
matter, media or subject (including 
geographic locale) and can be expected to 
administer it through both programmatic 
and regulatory operations. Such an 
agency can distribute and manage grants, 
undertake secretariat roles for industry 
or other interest group bodies, ensure the 
continued operation of marketplaces, and 
intervene when breaches of the regulatory 
aspects of the regime are detected. (See, 
for example, the Australian Pesticides and 
Veterinary Medicines Authority.)8
Characteristics of environmental commodity 
agencies
Environmental commodity agencies 
usually have a statutory basis for their 
existence or serve a statutory office 
holder.9 They are highly variable in their 
institution and practices. This is a direct 
result of being designed and activated 
to address a specific issue; they are, in 
other words, customised to their purpose. 
They might be predominantly judicial or 
executive as well as policy, programmatic 
and regulatory, in varying proportions 
dependent on the determined needs of the 
commodity or geographic location.
What unites these types of agencies 
into a single typology and distinguishes 
them from both environmental protection 
agencies and hybrid environmental 
agencies is the degree of focus. While 
an environmental commodity agency 
can look to all intents and purposes the 
same, the fact that it is highly focused on 
a type of regulated thing or a contained 
geographic location lends it a slightly 
different status. It is usually a very 
small agency with a highly independent 
culture, distinct from the departmental 
public administration culture, which can 
be viewed at arm’s length, even where 
there are reporting and service provisions 
between the agency and an umbrella 
institution.
The variability of form and the degree 
of independence can be influenced by 
the agencies’ revenue streams, which 
can originate with government, across 
jurisdictions, via industry registration 
payments, or any other number of 
mechanisms (see, for example, the 
Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority).10 Whatever revenue stream 
is directed towards the agency is usually 
isolated from general government 
revenue. Monies are therefore protected, 
which can lead to greater certainty in 
terms of the continued operation of the 
agency, though many agencies remain 
susceptible to agendas focusing on small 
government, and legislation repeal.
The potential issue of chief concern 
for environmental commodity agencies 
emerges from the relationship between 
them and their regulated communities 
(Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, 2013). Such 
agencies can often have their counterparts 
in peak industry bodies with which they 
have long-standing interactions. Such 
interactions are a necessity where interests 
align and a collaborative and cooperative 
approach is needed to address matters 
relating to an aspect of the commodity. 
The relationship can, however, become 
strained where interests do not align. 
Alternatively, such agencies may find 
themselves adopting industry interests 
as their own in a process of regulatory 
It is usually a very small agency with a 
highly independent culture, distinct from 
the departmental public administration 
culture, which can be viewed at arm’s 
length ...
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capture (ibid., pp.107-8). Where industry 
also provides the resource base for the 
agency, through licensing and registration 
fees, an expectation can develop that the 
environmental commodity agency exists 
for the sole purpose of advancing the needs 
of the industry, thereby compounding the 
issue. There are obvious knock-on effects 
arising from this combination of factors 
that have consequences for effective 
regulatory delivery.
In an attempt to address these issues, 
some agencies establish separate teams 
dedicated to responsive regulatory 
delivery, while the majority of the agency 
carries out programmatic work and some 
preventive compliance encouragement. 
While this appears to solve the issue 
by keeping a clear distinction between 
an agency’s support of industry and 
its regulation of the same, there can be 
subsequent cultural issues that arise from 
such a division, notably in terms of silos 
or stovepipes (McMahon, 2006).11 This 
sort of consequence is particularly evident 
in hybrid environmental agencies.
Hybrid environmental agencies
Hybrid environmental agencies are 
government departments, offices or 
bureaus that form a part of the public 
service providing support to the executive 
branch of government. They can be headed 
by a minister or secretary, or a political 
appointment of one type or another. They 
are, like any other public service body, 
tasked with giving effect to the policies 
of the government of the day. This is as 
opposed to explicitly implementing the 
law, which is much more the task of an 
environmental protection agency. (See, 
for example, the Australian Department 
of the Environment.)12
Characteristics of hybrid environmental 
agencies
It is worth noting that the hybrid 
environmental agency is not the same 
as a regulatory agency. Regulatory 
delivery is only one of three roles hybrid 
environmental agencies perform. As 
discussed previously, these roles are policy, 
programmatic and regulatory. Regulatory 
delivery is often the last role such an 
agency is given, and it is not one that 
always sits well within a hybrid agency. 
This can occur where an environmental 
protection agency operates inside a larger 
hybrid environmental agency, or where 
the environmental protection capability is 
integrated within the latter without formal 
organisational recognition of the role. This 
occurs because organisational distinctions 
tend to replicate the formalism of having 
a separate environmental protection 
agency. Additionally, the organisational 
lines operate in concert with cultural 
distinctions. 
Either way, the inclusion of regulatory 
roles within a programmatic and policy 
agency can be one of the key causes of 
challenges to these agencies achieving 
effective regulatory delivery (OECD, 
2014a, 2014b; New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2014). Additionally, 
Mumford highlights that ‘[t]he 
performance of regulators themselves is 
influenced by a range of incentives and 
underlying capabilities’ (Mumford, 2011, 
pp.36-7).
While hybrid environmental agencies 
perform three broad types of role, policy, 
programmatic and regulatory, each 
role has a different focus and intent. 
The distinction between roles and their 
implications for relationships is a core 
problem for hybrid environmental 
agencies, and leads to distinctions in agency 
cultures. The result can be silos within the 
organisation and communication issues 
outside the organisation. From time 
to time, governance arrangements can 
emerge that do not adequately address the 
particularities of each approach, leading to 
the inefficient and ineffective distribution 
of resources, the inappropriate setting of 
outcomes and misaligned measurements 
of success (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2014, ch.10).
Practical guidance
The use a systems approach as a diagnostic 
frame which considers all of the agencies 
working within a regulatory regime has a 
number of benefits. It provides practical 
guidance to policy makers, resource 
allocators and regulatory practitioners; it 
reinforces the need for institutional review 
and reform; and it points to further areas 
that might benefit from systematic review 
and research.
In terms of implementation, the 
characteristics of institutions make 
certain organisational challenges more 
likely to eventuate according to type. For 
example, regulatory capture is a greater 
issue in environmental commodity 
agencies, and silos can develop very 
clearly in hybrid environmental agencies. 
Equally, environmental protection 
agencies can develop weakness in policy 
areas that affect the overall regulatory 
regime. Alternatively, environmental 
protection agencies can find themselves 
in conflict with their programmatic and 
policy portfolio partners.
Policy implications
When developing implementation policy, 
or conducting reviews of effectiveness in 
the regulatory space, it is important to 
have regard to the systemic characteristics 
of regulatory institutions which pose 
foreseeable risks to regulatory outcomes. 
These risks, having been identified, can 
be mitigated or circumvented through 
proper policy planning. When reviews 
are undertaken, an effort can be made 
to determine the extent to which risk 
mitigation measures have managed to 
overcome the challenges that are present 
in regulatory institutions.
On the rare occasions when there 
is the scope to design a new regulatory 
institution, policy developers may have 
In terms of implementation, the 
characteristics of institutions make 
certain organisational challenges more 
likely to eventuate according to type.
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the opportunity to construct a model 
for regulatory delivery that overcomes 
the structural obstacles evident in 
past institutional forms. Additionally, 
it may be found that portfolios can 
be established or redesigned along 
systemic lines, dividing internal areas by 
function and making clearer delineations 
between programmatic and regulatory 
approaches. 
The New Zealand Productivity 
Commission report and the government 
response to it highlight the importance of 
practices and institutions in the regulatory 
field. In accepting these findings, it 
seems counterproductive not to consider 
such practices and institutions when 
developing policy aimed at achieving 
regulatory success.
Next steps
The study conducted here can be taken 
further in a number of ways. This can be 
done as a research undertaking, but also 
as an organisational exercise as part of 
reform processes to achieve continuous 
improvement. We recommend: more 
detailed mapping of regulatory practices 
and the interdependencies between them; 
and review of regulatory institutions as 
systems within a regulatory regime system 
as a whole.
Conclusion
The emergence of regulatory practice 
within traditional policy and 
programmatic environmental agencies 
raises particular issues, and recasts the 
relationships within the network of 
agencies that work together to achieve 
better regulatory outcomes. The balancing 
of roles can pose serious challenges to the 
achievement of environmental protection 
and other desired outcomes. Equally, 
awareness of the differences in roles can 
potentially generate solutions to a range 
of challenges. 
It is worth acknowledging that 
different agency types and approaches 
exist for a purpose. A simplistic approach 
to environmental protection is very 
unlikely to succeed. Rather, a diverse and 
complex set of supports and interventions 
is required to manage it effectively, many 
of which are external to the agency, 
however it is designed.
Having acknowledged the important 
differences in institutional roles and 
functions, the task then becomes one 
of more completely understanding the 
differences, and then ensuring appropriate 
resources are leveraged and directed in 
an appropriate way to achieve the desired 
effects (Bailey and Kavanagh, 2014). 
Environmental protection agencies, 
environmental commodity agencies 
and hybrid environmental agencies are 
collections of practices and capabilities. 
Each agency type can be assisted by 
policy, programmatic and regulatory 
approaches, which can supplement or 
undermine one another. The challenge 
lies in finding the right balance.
Given the challenges, and fortunately 
for regulators, the Regulatory Institutions 
and Practices report and the corresponding 
government response provide a great 
deal of information and guidance. More 
importantly, this information has been 
practically oriented and synthesised, 
such that the regulatory, compliance and 
enforcement community can draw upon 
these documents to advance agency-
specific requirements around regulatory 
capability and capacity.
1 It should be noted that the three core agencies are even 
more prominent when the environmental crime is situated 
within the context of transnational environmental crime. See, 
for	example,	Baldwin	et	al.,	2015;	Bisschop,	2015;	Wyatt,	
2013.
2 Examples of a geospatial location would be within a marine 
protected area or relating to something like Australia’s Great 
Barrier Reef.
3 See www.epa.vic.gov.au.
4 The issue of strong identification with agency mission and 
individual practitioner/professional role sets environmental 
protection agency staff apart from staff in environmental 
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